memorized; control of the subject matter to be taught throughout the educational system; control of the content of newspaper articles and editorials; development of a nationwide system of loudspeakers that reached into every neighborhood and village; domination of the broadcast media; the use of propaganda teams (xuanchuan dui) to indoctrinate specific segments of the population; and other methods.
The roles played by official propaganda in China today have declined considerably since the Maoist era, but remain an important part of Chinese political and cultural life. The more recent works of Lynch, Lee, Brady and Esarey have updated earlier studies-particularly by examining the commercialization of the media. 7 While Lynch and Lee tend to view the propaganda state as in decline as a result of commercialization of the media, Brady and Esarey find that the Party has been very adept at utilizing commercialization to enhance and strengthen the propaganda apparatus.
This article focuses on the institutional actors, mechanisms and processes of the propaganda apparatus in China today, and only secondarily on the issue of commercialization. I agree with Lynch that the overall power and efficacy of China's propaganda state today has declined a great deal, and argue that commercialization has been one of the main factors in this declining capacity, yet I also agree with Brady and Esarey that the CCP propaganda apparatus has been revitalized in recent years and remains fully capable of controlling the content of information that reaches the public when it decides to do so. Hence, the issuelike so much else concerning the government in China today-is really one of selective enforcement.
The Scope, Structure and Mechanisms of China's Propaganda System
Scope China's propaganda system (xuanchuan xitong) is a sprawling bureaucratic establishment, extending into virtually every medium concerned with the dissemination of information. According to one CCP publication, the scope of propaganda oversight includes: "newspaper offices, radio stations, television stations, publishing houses, magazines, and other news and media departments; universities, middle schools, primary schools, and other vocational education, specialized education, cadre training, and other educational organs; musical troupes, theatrical troupes, film production studios, film theaters, drama theaters, clubs, and other cultural organs, literature and art troupes, and cultural amusement parks; cultural palaces, libraries, remembrance halls, exhibition halls, museums, and other cultural facilities and commemoration exhibition facilities". 8 This expansive definition means that virtually every conceivable medium which transmits and conveys information to the people of China falls under the bureaucratic purview of the CCP Propaganda Department (hereafter CCPPD). In terms of channels of dissemination, the propaganda system encompasses an extensive range of media, publications and other outlets. Official government sources report that, in 2003, these included 2,262 television stations (of which 2,248 were "local"), 2,119 newspapers, 9,074 periodicals and 1,123 publishing houses which published 190,391 books. 9 In addition, hundreds of internal circulation papers and local gazetteers, approximately 68 million internet accounts with more than 100 million users, and more than 300 million mobile phone users fall under the purview of the CCPPD. 10 The writ of the CCPPD has remained the same since the Maoist era, although its actual oversight and active censorship have changed considerably. Given the pluralization and marketization of media, art and even education in China in recent years, it is simply impossible for the CCPPD and other censorship authorities to police all of these realms effectively. A significant effort has been made to police the internet (yintewang) with an estimated 30,000 human monitors and a variety of sophisticated technological filters and devices, 11 but even this has had its limitations, given users' ability to circumvent firewalls. Globalization and the opening of the Chinese television market to satellite and cable broadcasts have also brought various foreign broadcast and print media directly into Chinese homes and work units.
While the effectiveness of the CCPPD's ability to control the flow of information into and throughout China has eroded over time, it continues to have the capacity to censor and to crack down when and where it sees fit. Since 2004 in particular, under Hu Jintao's auspices and CCP directives, there has been a concerted crackdown on the media and concomitant strengthening of the propaganda apparatus. 12 Cases of forced closure, investigations, intimidations, persecutions, arrests, prosecutions, imprisonments, even deaths, are well documented in a report by exiled investigative journalist He Qinglian (herself an employee-turned-victim of the propaganda state). 13 In addition to these active mechanisms, the CCPPD has a passive control capability in the form of self-censorship, rather than direct bureaucratic intervention. Perry Link has drawn attention to this phenomenon, 14 and numerous interviews confirm it. Creative intellectuals-whether they are journalists, professors, artists or filmmakers-know the limits of the propaganda state, even if they are engaged in a process of constantly probing them. Not only do they have an innate sense of breaching established strictures and taboos, but interviews with scholars and journalists indicate that mechanisms exist which specify the limits (elaborated below).
Censorship, however, is only one side of the coin. The CCPPD is much more regularly engaged in what might be described as proactive propaganda-writing and disseminating the information that it believes should be transmitted to, and inculcated in, various sectors of the populace. As such, "propaganda" (xuanchuan) does not carry negative connotations for the CCP, nor, for that matter, for most Chinese citizens. Since its establishment 85 years ago, the CCP has viewed propaganda as education of the masses-a proactive tool to be used in educating and shaping society. It is seen as a legitimate tool for transforming and building the kind of society sought by the Party-a society labeled, since the 1980s, a "socialist spiritual civilization" (shehuizhuyi de jingshen wenming) or, more recently, a "harmonious society" (hexie shehui). 
Overall Structure
The bureaucracy of the Chinese propaganda system is enormous. The institutional epicenter of this system is the CCPPD, but a number of other State Council departments and regulatory organs are also important institutional parts of the system. This bureaucratic division of labor is described in a recent CCPPD publication: 15 The State Council Information Office (Guowuyuan Xinwenban, or SCIO) has overall authority for monitoring the content of news nationwide. The roles that these organs play in the propaganda system are elaborated below. By their own nomenclature, the system is divided into two separate but interrelated systems (xitong): internal and external propaganda.
Leading Groups
The internal propaganda system is composed of numerous Party and State Council organs. At the pinnacle of the system is the Central Leading Group on Propaganda and Ideological Work (Zhongyang Xuanchuan Sixiang Gongzuo Lingdao Xiaozu), hereafter CLGPIW. While the leading group has apparently existed since 1967 (encompassing education until a separate leading group was established for this in 1982), 16 it was formally constituted under its current name by Central Committee Directive (Zhongwei zhidao) No. 11 of 1988.
17 From 1967 to 1988 it was known as the Central Propaganda and Education Leading Group (Zhongyang Xuan-Jiao Lingdao Xiaozu), exemplifying the close link between educational and propaganda spheres. The 1988 Directive specified the CLGPIW's work: "Routinely analyze and monitor dynamics and trends in the ideological field; research and control propaganda work and direction (fangzhen); coordinate work in propaganda, theoretical, cultural, media, publishing, and other departments concerned with work in the ideological field; offer comments and suggestions to propaganda and theoretical units".
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The CLGPIW is composed of a head (zuzhang) and deputy, a head and deputy of the Secretarial Group (Mishuzu) and between five and eight members (chengyuan). These members are almost always reconstituted following a Party congress (every four years). Since the 14 th Party Congress in 1992 it has become conventional that the Leading Group head (presently Li Changchun) is a member of the Party Politburo Standing Committee, while the deputy head (presently Liu Yunshan) is the Minister of the Propaganda/Publicity Department, who is usually also a member of the Politburo. The Head of the Secretarial Group is currently Zhu Hong, and his deputy is Xie Yongjin. 19 The other current members of the Leading Group are not known. Zheng has been a leading figure in Party propaganda circles for many years, dating back to the early 1960s. More recently, he has authored and advocated the theory of China's "peaceful rise", and has been a close advisor to Hu Jintao on various theoretical and foreign policy issues. 27 As its name suggests, this Commission (leading group equivalent) is charged with overseeing the educational effort-largely carried out through schools and the media-to build an ethical (de) and upstanding culture. Targeted primarily at the nation's youth, the campaign to build a "spiritual civilization" has received both considerable publicity and resources from the Party Following the 14 th Party Congress, in 1993 Liu was promoted from the provinces to the Center in Beijing. He was immediately assigned to work in the Propaganda Department-where he has remained to the present day. Initially he was put in charge of Party affairs (dangwu gongzuo) in the CCPPD, but gradually over the next four years was exposed to different aspects of the department's work. This was a kind of apprenticeship period for Liu, as he was being carefully monitored and mentored by the CCPPD Minister Ding Guan'gen (who himself had been brought in to lead the department in 1992).
In the run-up to the 15 th Party Congress, as Jiang Zemin was doing his best to stack the Politburo with officials loyal to him, Jiang wanted to move Ding out of the job. Ding's principal patron, Deng Xiaoping, had passed away. Ding gave up day-to-day control of the Propaganda Department, and Liu Yunshan became his de facto successor (although Ding maintained the title and portfolio). Part of Ding's deal was to remain on the Politburo and remain in charge of the Central Leading Group for Propaganda and Ideological Work-thus maintaining his overall control over the propaganda apparatus.
This was the arrangement that prevailed for the next four years until the 16 The situation left Liu in a difficult position, as he had not been Jiang's choice for the job. Liu's first big test came when Jiang unveiled his theory of the "Three Represents" (Sange Daibiao) in a widely publicized speech at the Central Party School on 1 July 2001. 35 From the outset of the campaign until the spring of 2004, the clear and primary emphasis was on the first "represent", namely the drive to recruit "advanced productive forces" (entrepreneurs and business people) into the Party. 36 This was Jiang Zemin's emphasis as well. Liu Yunshan's Propaganda Department dutifully emphasized this element. However, beginning in the spring of 2003, after Hu Jintao had succeeded Jiang Zemin as General Secretary and Liu had been confirmed as CCPPD Director, the department began to shift the emphasis of the Three Represents campaign from the first to the third element. This dovetailed with Hu Jintao's (and Premier Wen Jiabao's) emphasis on the broad masses in society, the interior of the country, social stratification, and those left behind by economic reforms which had benefited the coastal and urban areas, the new entrepreneurial elite, and science and technology. Since shifting the emphasis in 2005, Liu has led Hu Jintao's propaganda campaign to build a "harmonious society" (hexie shehui). These can be graphically depicted as in Figure 1 . While this description must be considered fairly authoritative, given its source, it does not completely accord with other authoritative publications-both foreign and Chinese. It could be that Deputy Director Li was not completely clear or accurate in his description-whether by default or by design-and this is a possibility, given that he had only worked in the Central Propaganda Department for about a year at the time of the interview, spoke from no notes, and he himself was more concerned with theoretical work and Party history than with 43 and it is reasonable to assume that provincial and sub-provincial level Party organs parallel the central-level organ rather precisely. While there is some dispute between sources, they also indicate considerable consensus about the internal composition of the Propaganda Department today.
It is also useful to consider the roles played by three State Council organs in the propaganda process in China-the Ministry of Information Industry, the State Press and Publishing Administration and Xinhua News Agency, as well as the propaganda system in the People's Liberation Army.
Ministry of Information Industry
The MII (Xinxi Chanye Bu) was formally created as part of the State Council Organizational Reform Plan of 1998, as approved by the National People's Congress in March of that year. The new MII was constituted by combining together several existing ministries and commissions, as well as delegating some functions to other newly created organs. The MII absorbed the National Radio Management Commission; the State Council's (former) Leading Group on Information Work (Guojia Xinxihua Gongzuo Lingdao Xiaozu); administration and management of telecommunication standards of the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (including cable television); responsibilities for technical systems for radio and satellite networks and the coordinating functions for deciding satellite orbits from the former Space Industry Corporation and Commission on Science and Technology for National Defense (COSTIND); and the State Planning Commission's management of public telecommunications. The central task of the MII is to manage the technical aspects of electronic communications throughout China. It is not deeply involved in monitoring content of such communications (this is mainly the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Security). But insofar as it grants licenses and governs strategy for constructing the government and national telecommunications network, it plays the key role in the "hardware" side of the propaganda system in China. Its work also involves the military sector, as well as constructing secret communications systems for Party, government and military organs.
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The MII is located next door to the Central Propaganda Department at 13 West Chang'an Avenue in central Beijing (testimony to the close links between the two bodies), has one minister, four vice-ministers, 45 department directors and deputy directors, and a total of 320 professional staff. 46 The MII is organized into the fourteen departments shown in Figure 2 . 47 
General Administration of Press and Publications
The GAPP, formerly known as the State Press and Publishing Administration (Guojia Xinwen Chubanshu or Guojia Chuban Ju), 48 is something of a counterpart to the MII with respect to the publishing industry. While a State Council organ, the GAPP is linked closely to the CCP Propaganda Department. As CCPPD Deputy Director Li Congjun put it, "We guide the GAPP on issues of ideology". Guowuyuan jigou gaige gaikuang, pp. 126-27.
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Guowuyuan jigou gaige gaikuang, p. 132.
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Guowuyuan jigou gaige gaikuang, pp. 228-31. 48 In 2001 the SPPA was elevated to a ministerial-level organization and renamed the GAPP. Film and Television became responsible for imports of radio and TV programs from abroad. The 1998 reorganization also saw the devolution of many GAPP responsibilities to provincial-level press and publishing supervisory organs. This included examining and approving contents of newspapers, periodicals and magazines; approving and managing "internal" (neibu) publications; monitoring companies that produce electronic publications; approving contracts with foreign publishers; and managing wholesaling and distribution. 50 At the national level, the GAPP absorbed the State Copyright Bureau, and issuing, protecting and enforcing copyright infringement law has now become one of its major functions. The GAPP's other principal function is to oversee all standards in the publishing industry-everything from issuing ISBNs to monitoring pirating. Even though it transferred some degree of responsibility and directors, and a total professional staff of 145. 51 It is divided into ten departments and offices as shown in Figure 3 .
because of something they have published, it is the GAPP's responsibility to revoke the license and enforce the order-although it is often the determination of the CCPPD to close it down. According to the "Provisional Rules for the Administration of Periodicals", a periodical may not include, and can be closed because of, the following types of content:
1. inciting subversion of the regime of people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist system, national division, rebellion or rioting 2. inciting opposition to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party 3. inciting defiance or disruption of the implementation of the Constitution or laws 4. divulging state secrets, jeopardizing national security or harming national interests 5. inciting ethnic or racial discrimination or hatred, or disrupting national unity 6. propagating murder, obscenity or pornography or instigating criminal activities 7. insulting or slandering other people 8. hindering the impartial hearing of cases by judicial departments 50 Guowuyuan jigou gaige gaikuang, p. 226.
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Guowuyuan jigou gaige gaikuang, p. 231. When a newspaper, magazine or publishing house is to be closed down oversight for audiovisual products to the Ministry of Culture, the GAPP clearly The GAPP has one Administrator (Juzhang ), four deputies, one full-time Deputy Director of the National Copyrights Bureau, 31 department directors and deputy
The Xinhua (New China) News Agency Xinhua News Agency (China's official state news service) is a large and sprawling organization, reaching throughout the country and around the world. Bureaucratically, with the brief exception of 1980-82 when it was placed under the direct administrative control of the Central Committee and CCPPD, 53 Xinhua has always officially been an organ of the State Council.
From its inception, Xinhua has always had a dual role: to report news and to disseminate Party and state propaganda. This has been true both domestically and internationally. The division between these two functions has not always been distinct, although straightforward news reporting has increased and improved during the reform period.
In addition to the publications that it sponsors and supervises, Xinhua's internal organization is comprised of no fewer than 17 internal units, all of which are located in Xinhua's compound at 57 West Xuanwumen Street in central Beijing. These are shown in Figure 4 . 54 All of the editorial departments have cadres from the CCPPD assigned to them, who perform liaison functions with the CCPPD and oversee implementation of CCPPD directives and news guidance. 55 These individuals are, in effect, censors. However, the editors in each department also perform this role on a daily, hourly and minute-by-minute basis. For example, the Editorial Committee (Bianji Weiyuanhui) in Xinhua's International Department-which is comprised of editors from all the sub-sections of the International Departmentmeets at the beginning of the morning and evening shifts. At each session, the editors receive instructions from the CCPPD on topics to pay attention to or avoid, and specific terminology to use. After the meetings, the editors return to their sections and enter these instructions into a "red book" (hong benzi) for all journalists and section personnel to read and check in the course of their work. The "press guidance" in the "red book" is updated twice daily. Through these mechanisms, the CCPPD exerts its practical control over Xinhua news dispatches. After a while, journalists gain a "feel" for what the guidelines are, what is and is not acceptable, and thereby exert "self-censorship" in their work.
Xinhua also runs a network of numerous internal-circulation (neibu) publications in which information appears that is deemed too sensitive to publish openly. Most of these are distributed in very limited numbers and are classified secret (jimi), "carefully protect" (zhuyi baocun) or "internal usage" (neibu 53 Zhang Zhijian and Liu Junlin (eds), Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo zhengfu jigou wushinian, p. 165. kanwu). The Reference News Department of Xinhua publishes at least eight such internal publications. 56 Thus Xinhua really runs two very different news operations: one for the general public (influenced by propaganda and censorship) and one for officials (unvarnished and uncensored). This means that China's officialdom are actually quite well informed about the range of problems occurring in China and around the world, while they simultaneously control what the public should know.
The Military Propaganda System
Another key element of the domestic propaganda system is the People's Liberation Army's propaganda system. While closely linked to the CCPPD and the Party committee system inside the military, the PLA has its own propaganda system. It is administered at two levels: (1) by the General Political Department (GPD); and (2) through the Party committee (dangwei), Party branch (dang zhibu) and Party small group (dang xiaozu) systems. The distinction between the two, and the division of responsibility, really has to do with Party membership. The latter deals only with propaganda for Party members in the military, while the GPD is more broadly responsible for propaganda work for all members of the PLA. As the PLA remains, to a considerable extent, a "Party-army", the institutional penetration of the military by the Party is a (if not the) key mechanism for ensuring the PLA's loyalty to the CCP.
Historically, the GPD's principal function has been to indoctrinate the rank and file in the PLA and to be the military's institutional liaison to the Party, but today the GPD's portfolio is much broader (including personnel management, overseeing Party committees, managing the welfare of cadres, officers and veterans, military justice and some intelligence functions). 57 The GPD's Propaganda Department is one of the four principal departments in the GPD. It oversees and includes sub-departments for education, film and television, literature and arts, and a series of publications. At each level from military region commands down to regiments, a PLA commissar is designated to be in charge of propaganda work. 58 To this end, the GPD publishes numerous handbooks for their use; some are very detailed, not only about the content of propaganda work, but also the process of how to undertake it. The GPD is also responsible for publishing the Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun bao), the principal mouthpiece of the PLA (both hard copy and the electronic edition at http://pladaily.com.cn and http://english.pladaily.com.cn), seven military region newspapers and over 100 periodicals published by various PLA units, as well as overseeing the PLA's sprawling book-publishing empire. Like other things concerning the PLA, the military's own publishing and information system is a "system within a system".
External Propaganda
Beginning in the early 1980s, the CCP began to distinguish between internal and external propaganda (duiwai xuanchuan), and began to set up a separate bureaucratic apparatus to promote the latter. As China's involvement in world affairs grew, and its sensitivity to its image abroad increased, "external propaganda work" became more important to the leadership and as a tool of foreign policy.
The The Information Office is the "front" organ for the world-and particularly the foreign press corps in Beijing-but it is in fact one operational side of the EPLG and external propaganda work. Among other responsibilities, the Information Office is responsible for coordinating the compilation and publication of all government White Papers. External Propaganda towards Taiwan is a special aspect of external propaganda. 65 Propaganda aimed at foreigners resident in China and short-term visitors such as tourists and businessmen is also a priority. 66 perspectives, and promote Chinese culture abroad; (2) to counter what is perceived to be hostile foreign propaganda (such as the so-called "China threat theory"); (3) countering Taiwan independence proclivities and promoting unification; and (4) propagating China's foreign policy. 71 External propaganda efforts have, for example, targeted the United States in recent years. Various exhibitions have been sponsored by the State Council Information Office, including the week-long "Festival of China" at the Kennedy Center in Washington, DC, in September 2005 (for which the Information Office contributed $5 million). Other activities include taking out advertising in major US newspapers, providing film footage and "feeds" to US television networks, giving US reporters in China special briefings and taking them on special trips not granted to other foreign reporters, holding press briefings at the Chinese embassy in Washington, writing "letters to the editor" and placing editorials in US newspapers, using Chinese international affairs experts on the (Chinese) media, using Chinese émigré scholars to publicize China's viewpoints, targeting the Chinese-American community with a variety of activities, and (allegedly) paying expenses for specific Americans to visit China and cultivating foreign specialists and ex-officials to convey China's views. 72 Another example of external propaganda work is the annual World Forum on China Studies, begun in 2005 and ostensibly sponsored by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS). However, it is very clear that it is the Shanghai Municipality Propaganda Department's External Propaganda Bureau that underwrites the conference. Several dozen international China specialists are invited, with all expenses paid (compliments of the Propaganda Department and SASS). They are subjected to two days of not-so-subtle propaganda about China's "peaceful development" and intentions, China's desire to build a "harmonious society" at home and abroad, how China will never be a threat, and so on.
Another prominent example of external propaganda work is the substantial effort to establish a range of "Confucius Institutes" around the world. These organizations are sometimes free-standing entities while at other times they are embedded within universities or other cultural affairs organizations. Such foreign universities are typically approached by the Education Counselor of the local Chinese embassy offering "no strings attached" funds to establish a Confucius Institute. The recipient is told that the funding comes from the Ministry of 71 See description of external propaganda priorities in Central Propaganda Department Cadre Bureau Writing Group, Xin shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo, pp. 188-89.
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These activities are described in Xia Anling, "Meiguo dui hua jielun de tedian he women de duice" (Characteristics of America's Debate on China and Our Responses); Li Haibo, "Qiantan Meiguo chuanmei guanyu Zhongguo de baozhi ji wozhi duice" (An Exploratory Discussion on American Propaganda Concerning China and Our Countermoves); and Zhang Chongxian, "Dui Meizhi Zhongguo zhuianti baodao de pouxi he women de duice de jianyi" (American Newspapers Analysis of China Topics and Proposals for Our Countermoves), in Duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo, pp. 159-67, 168-82 and 183-91 respectively.
Education, but it is in fact laundered through the MOE from the CCPPD's External Propaganda Department. The purpose is to promote and popularize Chinese language and culture by offering Chinese language and culture classes, mounting exhibitions, staging theater and concerts and so on-all intended to promote China's cultural image and "soft power".
Another recent effort is the attempt by the external propaganda authorities to get major foreign media conglomerates-like Bertlesman or Pearson-to publish Chinese books abroad. Translation costs and publication subsidies are underwritten by the CCPPD (although often laundered through other front organs).
In sum, external propaganda work constitutes a very important, but commonly overlooked, component of China's propaganda system-one on which increasing priority has been placed in recent years. Progress has been made by Chinese propagandists and diplomats, but they still have a lot to learn about public relations and public diplomacy.
Process and Priorities of Propaganda Work
There are two principal types of domestic propaganda-intra-Party propaganda and mass propaganda. Each has its own distribution mechanisms and channels.
Intra-Party propaganda is, of course, targeted exclusively at Party members. 
China Youth Daily.
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The second mechanism for propagandizing Party members is the extensive system of Party schools (dang xiao) throughout China. In 1996 China had over 2,600 Party schools, averaging more than 80 per province! 76 The number may well be larger today. In addition to attending one of these institutions, Party members can also take distance learning correspondence courses (hanshou jiaoyu) from the Central Party School (CPS) in Beijing. 77 This institution, located near the Summer Palace on the outskirts of Beijing, is the national-level center of the system. 78 It runs courses for Party cadres at a variety of levels: for Central Committee members, for cadres at the ministerial and vice-ministerial level, for institute directors, for mayors, for cadres at the provincial and county level.
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Specially tailored courses are also offered for cadres in certain types of work, such as ethnic minority work, state-owned enterprises, united front work and so on. The CPS has about 600 personnel engaged in teaching, as well as a number of researchers and administrative personnel. While the Party School system is bureaucratically in its own xitong (system) under the Central Committee, it is a key institutional mechanism for propaganda work of leading Party cadres at the central, provincial and even county level (usually Party secretaries).
The third mechanism, targeted at lower-level Party cadres, is specialized training courses run for cadres working throughout China. At the end of 2001, there were a total of 40,510,000 cadres nationwide, of which 6,932,000 were fulltime Party cadres. 80 The Propaganda Department runs a variety of cadres' training courses for these personnel throughout the year. These are usually administered by provincial and sub-provincial Party schools, although sometimes they are put on in townships and villages themselves. There are annual and four-year guidelines set by the central authorities for the content of these courses. 81 82 The fourth mechanism is daily propaganda work undertaken by Party secretaries at the local (jiceng) level throughout all work units and across the nation. As of June 2002, there were 3,445,000 Party organs at the local level throughout China, of which only 168,000 were formal Party Committees, the vast majority being Party groups or cells (dangzu). 83 Propaganda work is supposed to occupy a significant amount of the time of such local level Party Committees, as indicated in the numerous handbooks published for use by local Party secretaries. 84 In this way, all Party members at the local level (below the county level), comprising about 80 per cent of the 66,355,000 members in mid-2002, are exposed to the CCP propaganda system. 85 The fifth mechanism is nationwide propaganda campaigns which are launched by the CCPPD in Beijing and administered by Party Propaganda Departments all the way down through the system. There have been countless numbers of these over the years. They range in character from campaigns to study certain speeches, documents or Party pronouncements, to campaigns to emulate certain models, to campaigns to criticize domestic officials or foreign governments, to campaigns for the mobilization of mass labor, to campaigns encouraging moral conduct and "spiritual civilization", to specific ideological campaigns. The latter is exemplified by the ongoing "Three Represents" and "Progressivism" (xianjinxing) campaigns. Each year the CCPPD issues two or three dozen directives in these areas. 86 
Publication Review Process
Another key element of the propaganda function is the review process for publications. It must first be acknowledged that in today's China a considerable and increasing amount of newspaper, magazine, journal and book publications are not routinely subject to review by the Propaganda Department or other censorial organs. The market and consumers are increasingly driving what is "fit to print". As a result, a bevy of racy magazines, DVDs, VCDs and CDs have popped up for sale on the street stalls around the country. They range in subjectmatter from military-related magazines that tout ways and means of attacking Taiwan to pop singers, underground films and pornographic materials.
Where the Propaganda Department and GAPP do ostensibly exercise their authority over publications is particularly with television and radio broadcast media, the newspaper media, popular magazines, scholarly journals and book publishing. Even here, however, the review process relies more on the discretion and self-censorship of individual authors and publishing houses.
There is, however, a formal review process that is supposed to take place to vet these publications. Newspaper editorials are the most closely vetted. All editorials in the main Beijing newspapers (People's Daily, Guangming Daily, China Youth Daily, Workers Daily and so on) must have their editorials cleared by the CCPPD prior to publication. In some cases, particularly in the People's Daily, the CCPPD drafts the editorial (pinglun) in the first place. The same holds true for main news stories in these papers and the Xinhua News Service. The CCPPD very clearly establishes the substance and even the language to be used in such articles. This is known as tifa, which literally means "formulation" or "wording". 87 In Xinhua News Agency this is sometimes called the "koujing" (unified path). The CCPPD sets and enforces the exact wording to be used by journalists, scholars and broadcasters in reporting on a given event. Deviation or variation from this tifa is a very serious transgression, and is punishable. In this way, the Propaganda Department keeps the nation's media and scholarly community "on message".
For scholars in China, another method of censorship and control involves vetting by relevant ministries or Party departments. 88 Depending on the subject matter of a book manuscript, scholars are supposed to submit their draft manuscript (cao'an shu) for pre-publication review by the government ministry or Party department responsible for that subject area. (Zhongyang Bianyi Ju). This mechanism does not necessary involve the CCPPD directly, but it provides reinforcement to ensure that the prevailing tifa is being used, that Central Party or government decisions are accurately portrayed as intended, and that state secrets are not leaked.
The Propaganda Meeting System
The other key element of the propaganda process that merits mention is the meeting system. The centerpiece of the propaganda meeting system is the annual conference of heads of propaganda departments from around the country (Xuanchuan Buzhang Huiyi). There is no fixed time for them to convene, although they usually meet in the first quarter of every year. 89 They also sometimes convene following an important Central Committee plenum. 90 This is by far the most important session in the annual calendar of the propaganda system (xitong). It is always addressed by the CCPPD Director and usually by the CCP General Secretary, who set out the themes and priorities for propaganda work for the coming year. These speeches are then published in the annual volumes Xuanchuan dongtai (Propaganda Trends) and Quanguo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi wenjian huibian (Collected Documents of the National Propaganda Thought Work Meeting), which are transmitted to all CCPPD departments nationwide as the guidelines (tiaoling) for annual propaganda work. These volumes often contain highly sensitive internal speeches by senior Chinese leaders.
There is also a second tier of meetings that take place throughout the year, organized according to different functional aspects of propaganda work. 91 Propaganda Departments at different levels also convene their own meetings and issue their own "guidance" documents throughout the year. 89 Taken together, these are the mechanisms and processes by which the CCPPD enforces (or, more accurately, attempts to enforce) the "Party line" (Dang de luxian) and attempts to control the media and other publications in China. While this system is still quite effectual, it also faces a number of challenges.
Challenges to China's Propaganda System
While its control and censorship abilities remain substantial, the propaganda authorities have lost some of their control in the face of technological modernization, social pluralization, economic marketization and globalization. They are also losing influence due to public cynicism and skepticism. Given the range of information now available to Chinese citizens (particularly urbanites) and the growing awareness of the general population, people are much less willing to believe what they are told by the state media organs. The debacle of the attempted government cover-up of SARS in 2003 only fueled this public cynicism.
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This was also made evident by an extraordinary diatribe against the Propaganda Department authored by a Peking University professor and published on the internet in 2004.
93 Jiao Guobiao's article was an unprecedented attack on the CCPPD, calling for its abolition. Jiao's broadside resulted in his dismissal and temporary exile abroad. The declining power and prestige of the CCPPD was similarly underscored in February 2006, when a group of Party elders who had retired from the propaganda apparatus brazenly warned the CCP of the dangers of excessive media control. The Party elders included Mao's former secretary Li Rui, former Propaganda Department chief Zhu Houze, former editor of People's Daily Hu Jiwei, and former deputy director of Xinhua News Agency, Li Pu. They warned in a (leaked) letter to the government: "At the turning point in our history from a totalitarian to a constitutional system, depriving the public of freedom of speech will bring disaster for our social and political transition and give rise to group confrontation and unrest. Experience has proved that allowing a free flow of ideas can improve stability and alleviate social problems".
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The Party Line and the Bottom Line Commercialization of the media also matters as the commercial "bottom line" is increasingly undermining the "Party line". The overall impact of the market 92 For an excellent assessment of the propaganda campaign associated with the SARS epidemic and cover-up, see Ashley Esarey, Caught Between State and Society and "Cornering the Market". means that China's citizen consumers have much more diversified and pluralistic media content. The government has little choice but to watch as these twin trends drive the industry. 95 Yet, as Ashley Esarey's research demonstrates, the government has also attempted to use its licensing authority to enforce its political will. 96 The publishing industry in China today runs on business principles of profit and loss, sales and revenue. 97 Competition for readership and advertising revenue is fierce, and consumer preferences are now the driving force in many editorial decisions. For many publications, state subsidies have declined considerably if not disappeared altogether-particularly for state and Party publications, which are having a hard time surviving without subsidies and guaranteed institutional subscribers. Hard-copy printing and distribution of such staples as the People's Daily have plummeted-from a circulation of 5 million copies per edition in the 1980s to an official figure of 1.8 million in 2004, although non-official estimates run as low as 200,000. 98 Foreign investment into the Chinese media industry is also increasing rapidly, further eroding state control.
The shift from propaganda to profit means that journalists, broadcasters, publishers and filmmakers must shift their thinking from being agents of the Party-state to being commercially viable, which in turn means that their product must be appealing enough for people to pay for it. They must also become more professional in their training and the daily practice of their profession. These new realities are occasionally reflected among the Party-state's propaganda czars. Liu Binjie, deputy director of GAPP, told the Financial Times: "We cannot make all newspapers and periodicals the mouthpiece of the Party and country. On this, we have already changed our frame of reference. In the past (media) work units relied on the government and not the market. Now we have to liberate them and push them towards the market". 99 in China "for posting messages or articles on the internet that were considered subversive". 107 Bulletin boards (BBS) are monitored particularly closely. 108 As foreign companies-such as Yahoo, Google and Microsoft-have entered the domestic Chinese market, they too have complied with government censorship regulations. 109 It should be evident that the daily shadow boxing among propaganda authorities, media producers, public consumers and commercial interests is intense in China today. This interplay is likely to only increase over time as the forces of commerce, technology, politics and consumer preferences interact.
Conclusion
This article has examined how China's propaganda system is institutionally structured, how it functions, and the challenges it is facing. While much can be learned about these subjects from Chinese sources, in many ways it remains a bureaucratic "black box". More case studies on different sectors of the Chinese media are needed to illuminate these processes and trends.
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The overall image one derives at present is of a bureaucratic system that has atrophied compared with its Maoist past, yet remains capable of controlling the content of most information available to the Chinese public. It remains an important instrument in the Party-state's toolbox of control. Yet it is also clear that the system is being buffeted by the forces of commerce, technology, globalization, public sophistication and cynicism. These forces inexorably erode the Party-state's control over the dissemination and content of available information, and cumulatively and progressively undermine the system and the regime's ability to control the minds and beliefs of its citizenry.
The ultimate question remains whether the Party-state can continue to maintain its ideational influence effectively in society when its guiding ideology is a mish-mash of slogans that few understand or believe, and when the institutional mechanisms for controlling and disseminating information are growing weaker over time. When the message becomes unbelievable, it is only a matter of time before the messenger is questioned. To be sure, the Party-state has many other means of control and influence but, if it is unable substantially to shape how people think and what they believe, it will have lost a key mechanism of its control and source of its legitimacy. If the Party-state loses the battle for minds, losing the battle of hearts will not be far behind. 
